Investment Behaviour of Financially Constrained Multinational Corporations: Consequences for the International Transmission of Business Cycle Fluctuations

The paper investigates the investment decision of a financially constrained multinational corporation (MNC) planning investment projects both at home and in a developing country. The collateral values of the projects diverge because of country specific transactions costs so that the willingness of banks to grant a loan depends not only on the MNCs financial wealth but also on the share of FDI in total investment. It is shown that i) variations in the MNCs financial standing affects FDI stronger than domestic investment, ii) FDI is likely to decrease following a macroeconomic shock to the MNC parent, and iii) domestic investment is likely to increase following a macroeconomic shock to the MNC affiliate.

Investment Behaviour of Financially Constrained Multinational

The paper investigates the investment decision of a financially constrained multinational corporation (MNC) planning investment projects both at home and in a developing country. The collateral values of the projects diverge because of country specific transactions costs so that the willingness of banks to grant a loan depends not only on the MNC's financial wealth but also on the share of FDI in total investment. It is shown that i) variations in the MNC's financial standing affects FDI stronger than domestic investment, ii) FDI is likely to decrease following a macroeconomic shock to the MNC parent, and iii) domestic investment is likely to increase following a macroeconomic shock to the MNC affiliate.multinational corporation, foreign direct investment, international business cycle

Government interventions in banking crises: Assessing alternative schemes in a banking model of debt overhang

We evaluate policy measures to stop the fall in loan supply following a banking crisis. We apply a dynamic framework in which a debt overhang induces banks to curtail lending or to choose a fragile capital structure. Government assistance conditional on new banking activities, like on new lending or on debt and equity issues, allows banks to influence the scale of the assistance and to externalize risks, implying overinvestment or excessive risk taking or both. Assistance granted without reference to new activities, like establishing a bad bank, does not generate adverse incentives but may have higher fiscal costs.Banking crisis; debt overhang; bank lending; capital structure

Bank Lending, Bank Capital Regulation and Efficiency of Corporate Foreign Investment

In this paper we study interdependencies between corporate foreign investment and the capital structure of banks. By committing to invest predominantly at home, firms can reduce the credit default risk of their lending banks. Therefore, banks can refinance loans to a larger extent through deposits thereby reducing firms’ effective financing costs. Firms thus have an incentive to allocate resources inefficiently as they then save on financing costs. We argue that imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs. However, the Basel II framework is shown to miss this potential.financial contracting, multinational corporations, internal capital markets

Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach

This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. As capital ratios affect the ability of banks to collect loans in a nonmonotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements. Moreover, high capital ratios may also constrain the amount a banker can borrow from investors. Consequently, the size of the banking sector may shrink.incomplete contracts, minimum capital requirements, bank capital, disintermediation, procyclicality

Banks’ Internationalization Strategies: The Role of Bank Capital Regulation

This paper studies how capital requirements influence a bank’s mode of entry into foreign financial markets. We develop a model of an internationally operating bank that creates and allocates liquidity across countries and argue that the advantage of multinational banking over offering cross-border financial services depends on the benefit and the cost of intimacy with local markets. The benefit is that it allows to create more liquidity. The cost is that it causes inefficiencies in internal capital markets, on which a multinational bank relies to allocate liquidity across countries. Capital requirements affect this trade-off by influencing the degree of inefficiency in internal capital markets.incomplete financial contracting, cross-border financial services, multinational banking, liquidity allocation, capital regulation

Behold the 'Behemoth'. The privatization of Japan Post Bank

This paper analyzes the privatization process of the Japanese Post Bank (JPB), the largest bank in the world. We report some evidence in favour of the "political view" of SOB's and argue that, before privatization, postal savings banks served as vehicles for politicians to reallocate funds in exchange for private rents. We ask why politicians in Japan decided to privatize the postal savings system, predict how the privatization will proceed and study the expected results of the privatization process. We argue that there will be no level playing field in bank competition after the start of the privatization process and discuss possible out-comes of JPB privatization on financial stability in Japan.Public banking, Japan, Privatization, Postal savings banks

Asset Tangibility and Capital Allocation within Multinational Corporations

We investigate capital allocation across a firm's divisions that differ with respect to the degree of asset tangibility. We adopt an incomplete contracting approach where the outcome of potential debt renegotiations depends on the liquidation value of assets. However, with diversity in terms of asset tangibility, liquidation proceeds depend on how funds have been allocated across divisions. As diversity can be traced back to institutional differences between countries, we provide a rationale for multidivisional decision- making in an international context. A main finding is that multinationals may be bound to go to certain countries when financiers cannot control the capital allocation.internal capital markets, multinational corporations, incomplete contracts, asset tangibility

Speculative and precautionary demand for liquidity in competitive banking markets

We demonstrate that the co-existence of different motives for liquidity preferences profoundly affects the efficiency of financial intermediation. Liquidity preferences arise because consumers wish to take precautions against sudden and unforeseen expenditure needs, and because investors want to speculate on future investment opportunities. Without further frictions, the co-existence of these motives enables banks to gain efficiencies from combining liquidity insurance and credit intermediation. With standard financial frictions, banks cannot reap such economies of scope. Indeed, the co-existence of a precautionary and a speculative motive can cause efficiency losses which would not occur if there were only a single motive. Specifically, if the arrival of profitable future investment opportunities is sufficiently likely, such co-existence implies inefficient separation, pooling, or even non-existence of pure strategy equilibria. This suggests that policy implications derived solely from a single motive for liquidity demand can be futile

Internationale Finanzintegration und Stabilität: Ursachen und vorläufige Lehren

Since its beginning, the recent financial market turmoil that has come to be known as the „subprime crisis“ has provoked considerable controversy among both, policymakers and scientists. The debate mainly focuses on two questions. The first is whether and how short-term measures should be taken to stabilize the global financial system. The second is which general lessons can be drawn from this crisis. Up to now, several potential causes of the crisis have been discussed in a more or less isolated manner. However, a predominant source of the crisis has not been identified yet. Accordingly, there is still a lack of knowledge regarding general consequences of the crisis for economic policy. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, we show that to a large extent the crisis is due to the economic integration of formerly peripheral countries into the world economy that led to significant savings and investment imbalances. Thus, we argue that the crisis not only is a global phenomenon in its effects but also has global roots. Based on this argument, the second purpose of our paper is to derive implications for economic policy, where we also discuss the consequences for the future design of the global financial architecture.